Assessing the Resilience of Modern Satellite Internet Services Against GPS Spoofing Attacks
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报告开始:2026年10月13日 14:00(Asia/Ho_Chi_Minh)

报告时间:15min

所在会场:[S3] Track 3: Privacy, Security for Networks [S3-1] Track 3: Privacy, Security for Networks

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摘要
The rise of satellite-based Wi-Fi through large-scale
satellite constellations offers unprecedented global connectivity,
requiring only a small receiver for internet access from virtually
anywhere. However, this technology introduces new security
vulnerabilities, with one such vulnerability being a reliance
on GPS signals, which are susceptible to spoofing attacks.
While previous research has explored different GPS spoofing
techniques, the impact of such attacks on satellite-based internet
systems remains largely unexplored. This study examined the
effects of GPS spoofing on a satellite-based internet receiver
through a controlled experiment using a HackRF One to conduct
an impersonation attack. The receiver was spoofed to various
locations to assess the effect on network performance. A total
of 63 tests were successfully performed. Of these, 54 tests used
the speed test of the app associated to the satellite receiver to
measure download speed, latency, and packet loss percentage.
The remaining 9 tests used Wireshark to monitor a 1 GB
file download, recording average throughput, average packet
size, and total download time. Experiment results indicate that
network performance remained largely unaffected. For example
average download speed changing at most ±10 Mbit/s for all
spoofing distances, even when a handheld GPS device was
successfully spoofed. Two outliers were observed during testing,
both occurring in the app speed tests. These findings suggest
that the satellite signal receivers either employ additional built-in
protections against spoofing or mitigate such attacks by leverag-
ing the satellite constellation for location verification. While this
study provides initial insights, further research utilizing more
sophisticated attack techniques and hardware modifications is
needed to comprehensively evaluate the resilience of modern
satellite internet receivers against GPS spoofing attacks.
关键词
Satellite Communication
报告人
Andrei Gurtov
Professor Linkoping University

Andrei Gurtov is a Professor of Computer Science at Linköping University, Sweden. Previously he was at University of Oulu (3 years) and Aalto University (6 years) and visiting the International Computer Science Institute at Berkeley multiple times. He received his M.Sc (2000) and Ph.D. (2004) degrees in Computer Science from the University of Helsinki, Finland.  Prof. Gurtov co-authored over 200 publications, including 4 books, 8 IETF RFCs, 6 patents, over 60 journal and 110 conference articles. He supervised 15 PhD theses.

Professor Gurtov’s research interests are in network protocols, security of vehicular, airborne, industrial systems, mobile, wireless and IoT networks, SmartGrids. He is an ACM Distinguished Scientist, IEEE ComSoc Distinguished Lecturer (2016-19) and Chair of IEEE Sweden section (2021-2024). He received best paper awards at IEEE CSCN’17 and IEEE Globecom’11, was co-adviser of the best Doctoral Thesis in CS in Finland in 2017. He had served on numerous journal editorial boards and conference program committees, including IEEE Internet of Things journal, MDPI Sensors, IEEE ICNP, ACM MSWiM, and IFIP Networking. URL: http://gurtov.com

 

稿件作者
Martin Hägglund Linköping University
Gurjot Singh Linköping University
Andrei Gurtov Linköping University
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重要日期
  • 会议日期

    10月11日

    2026

    至

    10月14日

    2026

  • 12月30日 2025

    报告提交截止日期

  • 09月28日 2026

    提前注册日期

  • 10月10日 2026

    初稿截稿日期

  • 10月14日 2026

    注册截止日期

主办单位
United Societies of Science
承办单位
Posts and Telecommunications Institute of Technology
协办单位
IEEE Section
IEEE Vietnam Section
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